State of Michigan v Craig Horton

State of Michigan v CRAIG HORTON

No. 304803

Michigan Court of Appeals

August 14, 2012, Decided

Prior case history: Lapeer Circuit Court. LC No. 2010-010538-AR.

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and OWENS and BOONSTRA, JJ.

OPINION

     Per Curiam.

     Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the order of the circuit court affirming the trial court's dismissal of the charges against defendant. We reverse and remand for reinstitution of the charges, and for further proceedings.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURE

     On December 18, 2009, at approximately 1:52 a.m., Lapeer Police Department Officer Steven Hinsberger observed defendant turn right when faced with a steady red light, in violation of a posted "No Turn on Red" sign. Hinsberger initiated a traffic stop, and upon making contact with defendant observed a strong odor of intoxicants emanating from the vehicle and that defendant's eyes were glassy and his speech was slurred. Defendant subsequently failed five out of six sobriety tests and recorded blood-alcohol content readings of 0.14 and 0.12 as measured by Preliminary Breath Test and Datamaster respectively. Defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 or more, contrary to MCL 257.625(1). The road upon which the sign was located was under the jurisdiction of the City of Lapeer.

     Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that no certified traffic control order for the "No Turn on Red" sign he had allegedly violated had been filed with county clerk as required by law. Defendant asserted that the traffic stop was therefore invalid, and that all evidence obtained following the invalid traffic stop should be suppressed. Plaintiff argued that there was no requirement that a traffic control order be filed, but that even if such a requirement did exist, a certified copy of the traffic control order had been properly filed with the city clerk for the City of Lapeer. Plaintiff also asserted that even if the traffic control order had been improperly filed, suppression was an improper remedy, as Hinsberger had a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation may have occurred at the time he stopped defendant.

     The trial court found that while Hinsberger had done nothing wrong, the fact that no traffic control order had been filed with the county clerk rendered the traffic stop invalid, and that all evidence flowing from the traffic stop was subject to suppression. Accordingly, the trial court suppressed all such evidence and dismissed the case against defendant. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision to the circuit court, which affirmed the trial court's suppression and dismissal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

     We review the district court's ultimate decision to admit or suppress evidence for abuse of discretion. People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184, 192; 783 NW2d 67 (2010). Because this Court "essentially sits in the same position as the circuit court when determining whether the district court abused its discretion," the circuit court's decision is not entitled to deference. See People v Hudson, 241 Mich App 268, 276; 615 NW2d 784 (2000). We review de novo preliminary issues of law regarding admissibility based upon construction of a constitutional provision or statute. People v Jambor (On Remand), 273 Mich App 477, 481; 729 NW2d 569 (2007). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. People v Swafford, 483 Mich 1, 7; 762 NW2d 902 (2009).

III. THE "NO TURN ON RED" SIGN WAS A VALID TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICE

     Defendant argues that the "No Turn on Red" sign in question was invalid because the "traffic control order" reflecting the placement of the sign was filed with the Lapeer city clerk rather than the county clerk. We disagree.

     The parties agree that the sign in question was a "traffic control device" as defined by MCL 257.70 of the Michigan Motor Vehicle Code, which reads:

     "Traffic control devices" means all signs, signals, markings, and devices not inconsistent with this act placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic.

     "Traffic control order" is defined in MCL 257.71, which reads:

     "Traffic control order" means an order officially establishing the location of traffic control devices and traffic control signals on the highways of this state by the authority having jurisdiction over such highway and filed with the county clerk of the county traversed by such highway. A certified copy thereof shall be prima facie evidence in all courts of the issuance of such order.

     Contrary to defendant's argument, nothing in the definition of "traffic control order" predicates the validity of a traffic control device on the filing of such an order with the county clerk. Similarly, nothing in the definition of "traffic control devices" requires the filing of a traffic control order with the county clerk, since the statutory section is merely definitional. The only statute regulating the placement of traffic control devices by local authorities is MCL 257.610(a), which reads:

     Local authorities and county road commissions in their respective jurisdictions shall place and maintain such traffic control devices upon highways under their jurisdiction as they may deem necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this chapter or local traffic ordinances or to regulate, warn or guide traffic. All such traffic control devices hereafter erected shall conform to the state manual and specifications. (Emphasis added).

     The Michigan Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, however, makes no mention of traffic control orders, and requires only that "[t]raffic control devices [. . .] within the highway right-of-way shall be placed only as authorized by a public authority or the official having jurisdiction [. . .] for the purposes of regulating, warning and guiding traffic." 2011 Michigan Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, Section 1A.08 Standard 1. Further "[a]ll regulatory traffic control devices shall be supported by laws, ordinances, and regulations." 2011 Michigan Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, Section 1A.08 Standard 3. The guidelines for this section indicate that "unauthorized," "unofficial," or "nonessential" traffic control devices placed on a highway right-of-way should be removed. Id.

     The City of Lapeer, as permitted by the Motor Vehicle Code, has adopted the Uniform Traffic Code for Cities, Villages, and Townships ("UTCCVT"). Lapeer Ordinance § 14.01. Under the UTCCVT, the authority to regulate traffic is exercised by the issuance of traffic control orders which "become effective upon being filed with the clerk and upon erection of adequate signs or signals that give notice of the existence of the regulation [. . .]." 2002 AACS, R 28.1153(1). The term "clerk" is defined under the UTCCVT as "the person who is elected or appointed to the office of clerk of this governmental unit." 2002 AACS, R 28.1154. The "governmental unit" is defined under the UTCCVT as "an incorporated city, an incorporated village, or township." 2002 AACS, R 28.1001(1)(i). In this case, the "clerk" would be the person who is appointed to the office of clerk for the City of Lapeer.

     The sign at issue thus was valid under the city of Lapeer traffic code, and was "supported by laws, ordinances, and regulations." It was not "unauthorized," "unofficial," or "nonessential." We do not read the Motor Vehicle Code to say that a traffic control device on a local road is invalid because a traffic control order was filed with a city clerk rather than the county clerk, despite its validity under a municipality's traffic code. We note that the Chapter 6 of the Motor Vehicle Code states that its provisions "shall not be considered to prevent local authorities with respect to streets or highways under the jurisdiction of the local authority and within the reasonable exercise of police power from . . . [r]egulating traffic by means of . . . traffic control signals" as well as "[r]egulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles at intersections." MCL 257.606(c), (j).

     We therefore conclude that the "No Turn on Red" sign at issue in the instant case was a valid traffic control device, and thus the district court erred by finding it invalid and suppressing all evidence that flowed from the traffic stop.

IV EVEN IF THE TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICE WAS INVALID, SUPPRESSION IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY

     We further agree with plaintiff that even if the traffic sign precipitating the traffic stop in this case was invalid, suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of that traffic stop was inappropriate.

     The Constitutions of the United States and Michigan guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const Am IV; Const 1963, Art 1 § 11. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and reasonableness requires a fact-specific inquiry, which is ultimately measured by examining the totality of the circumstances. People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 314; 696 NW2d 636 (2005). In general, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 810; 116 S Ct 1769; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996). A mistake of law is objectively unreasonable, while a mistake of fact is not. United States v Tibbetts, 396 F3d 1132, 1138-1139 (CA 10, 2005).

     There is little question that any mistake on Hinsberger's part was a mistake of fact and not of law. Hinsberger was correct in his understanding of the law, i.e., in his belief that it is a violation of the law to make a right turn on red light in the presence of a valid "No Turn on Red" sign. MCL 257.612. Hinsberger observed defendant turn right at a red light despite the presence of such a sign. The traffic control order authorizing the placement of the sign was filed in 1989, permitting the inference that the sign had been posted at that location for some time. Hinsberger's belief in his authority to stop defendant did not spring from a mistaken belief that legal conduct was illegal, but rather from his factual presumption that any required filings had been made in the proper location. The propriety of a traffic stop does not depend on whether a defendant is actually guilty of committing a traffic offense, but rather whether the officer reasonably believed defendant committed such an offense. See United States v Cashman, 216 F 3d 582, 587 (CA 7 2000).1 Further, as stated above, we have determined that the sign was in fact valid. However, even assuming the invalidity of the sign, such a mistake of fact was insufficient to render the traffic stop objectively unreasonable, and as such, the lower courts erred by dismissing the charges against defendant. As the United States Supreme Court has stated:

     It would be superfluous to multiply these examples. It is apparent that in order to satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government--whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer executing a warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement--is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable. [ Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 US 177, 185; 110 S Ct 2793, 2800 (1990).]

     The underlying purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter objectively unreasonable police conduct. People v Short, 289 Mich App 538, 549-550; 797 NW2d 665 (2010). Objectively unreasonable police conduct is defined as "conduct which an officer knows or should know violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. Suppressing the evidence from the traffic stop in this case would do nothing to deter police officers from conduct that they know or should know violates the Fourth Amendment. The lower courts' reliance on the exclusionary rule in suppressing the evidence obtained during the traffic stop in question was contrary to the explicit purpose of that rule.

     Reversed and remanded for reinstitution of the charges against defendant, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

     /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

     /s/ Donald S. Owens

     /s/ Mark T. Boonstra