In People v Edwards, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that, under the right circumstances, Miranda rights might apply to preliminary questions during a drunk driving investigation. This case is unpublished, but I have advocated the position adopted by the Michigan Court of Appeals in this decision for many years. This case deserves a spot in any DUI lawyer's trial notebook.
People v. Edwards
Mich: Court of Appeals, 2018
[Defendant] next asserts that his constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated because he was not given his Miranda rights before [the arresting officer] questioned him.
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The record reflects that during the traffic stop, [the arresting officer] asked [Defendant] if he had been drinking alcohol before driving, and [Defendant] answered that he had consumed six beers. On appeal, [Defendant] argues that his statement, i.e., that he had drank six beers, was inadmissible because [the arresting officer] did not first advise him of his Miranda rights.
A defendant who is arrested and subjected to custodial interrogation has a right to be warned "that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). The key point in the analysis is that the defendant must be subjected to a custodial interrogation, meaning that he or she has been subjected to questioning after being taken into custody or significantly "deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way." People v Steele, 292 Mich App 308, 316; 806 NW2d 753 (2011). Whether an individual is in custody depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id. As a general rule, "a motorist detained for a routine traffic stop or investigative stop is ordinarily not in custody within the meaning of Miranda." Id. at 317. This is because, "unlike a stationhouse interrogation, the roadside questioning and detention of a driver in such a situation is brief and spontaneous," and typically does not involve a "police dominated" atmosphere that might make an individual believe that they are "completely at the mercy of the police." People v Burton, 252 Mich App 130, 139-140; 651 NW2d 143 (2002) (quotation marks omitted).
This case, however, does not constitute a typical roadside stop. [The arresting officer] testified that he was parked in a parking lot near the intersection of 24th Street and Beard when he observed [Defendant’s] truck. Although the speed limit was 35 miles per hour, [the arresting officer]'s radar gun indicated that [Defendant] was traveling 49 miles per hour. Without activating his lights, [the arresting officer] followed [Defendant] for a short distance before observing him turning into a Speedway parking lot. [Defendant] was already out of his truck and approximately halfway to the Speedway store before [the arresting officer] activated his emergency lights. [The arresting officer] exited his police cruiser and twice yelled for [Defendant] to return to vehicle. Although [Defendant] looked at him, he did not otherwise respond, and he entered the store. [The arresting officer] testified that he ran after [Defendant] and again ordered him to return to his truck. This time [Defendant] complied with the directive. Thus, the record reflects that [Defendant] was commanded by a police officer to return to his parked vehicle and answer questions without being given an explanation for what the officer suspected him of doing wrong. Further, [Defendant’s] testimony at trial, made it clear that he did not believe [the arresting officer] was speaking to him when he first yelled at him to return to the truck, and he also testified that he was alarmed and confused when [the arresting officer] chased him into the store and yelled at him to return. Under these circumstances, we conclude that [Defendant] was arguably subjected to a custodial interrogation after he returned to his vehicle because he was significantly deprived of his freedom of action. See Steele, 292 Mich App at 316.